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Abstract
Mentalising is assumed to be involved in decision-making that is necessary to social interac-
tion. We investigated the relationship between mentalising and three types of strategic games –
Prisoners’ Dilemma, Dictator and Ultimatum – in children with and without autistic spectrum
disorders. Overall, the results revealed less dramatic diVerences than expected among the nor-
mally developing age groups and the children with autism, suggesting that in these laboratory
tasks, mentalising skills are not always necessary. There were, nonetheless, some important
Wndings. Young children were more cautious about initiating cooperation than their older
peers and, in bargaining situations, they were less generous in their opening unilateral grants
and over-solicitous of an empowered receiver. Participants with autism did have a harder time
shifting strategy between versions of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, and they were much more likely
to accept low initial oVers in the Ultimatum game and to refuse fair proposals. In addition,
participants’ measured mentalising abilities explain intentional and strategic behaviour within
the prisoners’ dilemma and the avoidance of unsuccessful ultimatum proposals.
 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
As crawling gives way to toddling and then striding, a child may move more
steadily through the physical world. So too, improvements in her ability to mentalise –
that is, attribute, understand and manipulate mental states such as beliefs, feelings,
thoughts, intentions and deceptions – allow her to navigate deeper into the cross-cur-
rents of the broader social world. For individuals with autistic spectrum disorders
there exists a fundamental diYculty in mentalising and social life is a series of strong
headwinds, uncertain tacks, and treacherous eddies. SpeciWcally, individuals with
autistic spectrum disorders (ASD) fail to understand not only that others have minds,
but also that other minds have diVerent thoughts, and that behaviour is determined by
mental states. Thus, individuals with autism are considered to lack a ‘theory-of-mind’
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 1993,
2000).
While diYculties with theory-of-mind are widespread in individuals with autism,
certain of these individuals appear able to acquire some degree of theory-of-mind
understanding. In a meta-analysis, Happé (1995) reported that children with autism
required a higher level of verbal ability, as measured by the British Picture Vocabu-
lary Scale, in order to pass simple theory-of-mind tasks (the Sally–Anne and Smarties
false belief tasks), than did normally developing 3- and 4-year olds or children with
learning disabilities but without autism. It may be that the high verbal ability of these
individuals allowed them to ‘hack out’ a solution to the tasks (Happé, 1995). Conse-
quently, depending on a situation’s degree of social complexity, the responses of such
individuals with autism may be adequate and yet odd, or simply inapt and inept.
The limited ability of individuals with autism to compensate for their deWcit in
theory-of-mind has been demonstrated in two recent experiments. Castelli, Frith,
Happé, and Frith (2002) asked participants to provide verbal interpretations of ani-
mations of two moving triangles. Each animation was scripted to show random,
goal-directed or mentalising movements. Compared to their normally developing
peers, individuals with ASD made fewer and less accurate interpretations only of the
animations that evoked mentalising, for example when two triangles bounced up and
down together in glee. A much more natural interaction was viewed by participants
in Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, and Cohen (2002) study. While their eye move-
ments were tracked, these participants watched dramatic scenes from a famous Holly-
wood movie. Individuals without autism focused mostly on the eyes of the actors;
individuals with autism Wxated mainly on the mouths. In contrast, when the scene
showed a character reaching for a gun, the eyes of the individuals with autism moved
directly to the object while those of the matched controls lingered on the actor’s face,
presumably to gather clues about his intentions. Thus, there is striking evidence that
individuals with high-functioning autism read minds diVerently from their peers.
While their performance on standard laboratory tasks of theory-of-mind (generally
false belief) can be good, they are severely developmentally delayed in acquiring such
ability, produce unusual explanations of their theory-of-mind understanding, per-
form poorly on advanced tests of theory-of-mind, and do not show the same sponta-
neous reactions to naturalistic task demands as their non-autistic peers.D. Sally, E. Hill / Journal of Economic Psychology 27 (2006) 73–97 75
All the studies above placed the participants in the role of an observer of another
person or of a social interaction. Clearly, individuals with ASD experience diYculties
with mentalising in this setting, but little has been documented empirically about the
implication of this diYculty in their daily interactions with others. What happens
when the person with autism is not spectator but participant, not outside but inside
the interaction? The aim of the current study was to pursue this question by investigat-
ing the performance of both younger and older children, some of whom were nor-
mally developing and some of whom were diagnosed with autistic spectrum disorders,
using a series of games.
Tic-tac-toe (also known as noughts and crosses), as any 10-year-old can testify, is
a fairly trivial game, in part because the optimal strategy is so easily learned (capture
the centre square with your “x” or “o”) and is largely impervious to the behaviour or
characteristics of one’s opponent. However, when a game becomes more complex
and its strategy space grows, optimal strategies are harder to calculate, errors are
more readily made, and signals are more easily sent. In these games, the ability to
mentalise may help a player anticipate where the other’s memory, information, and
calculation are limited and what strategy she is likely to employ. A well-drawn men-
tal model may also distinguish when the counterpart’s surprising move is a mistake
or a bluV or a trap.
The participants in the complex games of poker and combat testify to the value of
mentalising. A high-stakes card player, whose winnings depend on his abilities to
deceive his competitors and to dispel others’ bluVs, claims (with a bit of grandiosity),
“A man’s character is stripped bare at the poker table. If the other players read him
better than he does, he has only himself to blame. Unless he is both able and prepared
to see himself as others do, Xaws and all, he will be a loser in cards, as in life”
(Holden, 1990). Similarly, leaders on the battleWeld rely on mental models of their
counterparts to construct strategies and decipher tactical movements (see, for exam-
ple, the memoirs of Grant, 1999/1885; Rommel, 1953).
While these zero-sum games are signiWcant, it is principally through mixed-motive
games that researchers have analyzed social and strategic interactions among
humans, among other primates, birds and other vertebrates, insects, plants, genes,
corporations, countries, political parties, classes, voters, etc. In the laboratory, three
mixed-motive games in particular, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Ultimatum game, and
the Dictator game have been employed to study varying levels of cooperation and
competition, concern for fairness, self-interest and altruism among experimental par-
ticipants. Thousands of studies have been conducted of these three critical games,
and participants have usually manifested a cooperativeness greater than that pre-
dicted by the models of strict, rational self-interest historically prominent in both
biology – natural selection at the individual level – and economics – homo economi-
cus (for reviews, see Camerer, 2003; Sally, 1995).
It is not necessary to mentalise in order to play a mixed-motive game or cooper-
ate within such a game. For example, viruses competing to infect and reproduce in
the same set of host cells are “playing” (insensibly and non-mentally) a Prisoner’s
Dilemma game in which an inability to cooperate lowers the Wtness of each
phage (Turner & Chao, 1999). Furthermore, biologists have discovered relatively76 D. Sally, E. Hill / Journal of Economic Psychology 27 (2006) 73–97
sophisticated and accommodating strategies adopted by animals without the cogni-
tive ability to form mental models – rotating responsibilities for approaching possi-
ble predators among stickleback Wsh (Milinski, 1987), reciprocal food sharing by
vampire bats (Wilkinson, 1984), and the coordinated capture of grasshoppers and
moths by certain species of spiders (Pasquet & KraVt, 1992). Evolutionary game the-
orists assume that the tactics of these creatures are encoded in their genes, that con-
speciWcs are paired with a certain frequency in strategic interactions, and that Wtness
and oVspring accrue to the genes and the individuals with the more robust strategy.
So, vampire bats share food reciprocally because repeated interactions among col-
ony-mates make that strategy more “proWtable” than one based on always taking
food and never giving. These bats are not analysing, rationalising, mentalising, or
improvising: they are simply following an established evolutionary rule in a familiar
situation.
Nevertheless, among humans mixed-motive games do seem to require that players
signal and interpret intentions and develop some theory of the other’s mind (Schel-
ling, 1960). In the parlance of economics, then, mentalising and rule-following are
substitutes in the same way that butter and margarine, aluminium and tin, work and
the national lottery, cars and public transportation, and wisdom and information are.
Few substitutes are perfect for all applications. A chef may be indiVerent about
which spread is applied to her morning toast, but would refuse to use oleo in even the
simplest pastry, as butter makes a distinctly better crust. Similarly, the key research
question we raise is, do mixed-motive games require speciWc mentalising abilities or
will some form of rule-following suYce? Does the development of theory-of-mind
promote cooperation, generosity, and fairness, or does it foster treachery and selWsh-
ness?
2. Experiment one – Prisoner’s Dilemma
Without question, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is the most thoroughly studied
game in the social and biological sciences because it captures the essence of a fre-
quent social quandary, namely, that what is good for the group may diVer from what
is good for each individual. Despite the gloomy Nash equilibrium of mutual defec-
tion and the predicted triumph of narrow self-interest over altruism, humans and
other creatures often “solve” the PD and achieve mutual cooperation. Theorists have
distinguished two principal means which aid mutual cooperation: kinship and reci-
procity. It makes evolutionary sense for close kin to sacriWce on each other’s behalf in
order that their shared genes may prosper, and so brothers and sisters, rather than
third cousins, will cooperate in the PD (Hamilton, 1964). Kin recognition depends on
cognitive mechanisms able to read and react to perceptible clues of relatedness
(Krebs, 1987), and vestiges of these prehistoric mechanisms translate into our mod-
ern predilection for people who are proximate, similar and familiar (Sally, 2000).
Hence, in laboratory experiments, cooperation is more frequently seen when partici-
pants are near each other, can see each other, have information that they share tastes
and opinions, like each other, and have interacted previously (Sally, 1995, 2000).D. Sally, E. Hill / Journal of Economic Psychology 27 (2006) 73–97 77
Finally, if the PD is repeated, a population of reciprocal altruists whose strategy is
based on doing this round what the opponent did the previous round, can multiply
and survive by reacting harshly to full-time defectors and nicely to full-time co-oper-
ators and to each other. Axelrod (1984) conducted a famous computerized tourna-
ment of repeated PDs in which the winner was this so-called tit-for-tat strategy.
Tit-for-tat (TFT) is a simple rule that requires absolutely no mentalising. One uni-
laterally cooperates in the initial round and then observes what move the counterpart
actually makes so that it can be reciprocated in the next round. Intentions play no
role here. Moreover, this type of player plays TFT with his brother and with a
stranger, with a fellow club member and with an enemy, with a counterpart who
promises to cooperate and with one who vows to defect. Such a rule-follower is rela-
tively unaVected by changes in the social context of the game and is more likely to
miss other changes in a game that occur below the surface. By contrast, kinship-
based altruism is more closely linked to mentalising, both because the sharing of
mental states is a sign of similarity and relation, and because the presence of those
who are close, similar, and familiar is more likely to trigger an individual’s theory-of-
mind (Sally, 2001). Hence, the identity of the opponent makes a signiWcant diVerence
in the likelihood that a player chooses to cooperate. If the opponent’s identity is
changed from human to machine, even though the pre-programmed strategy is un-
altered, experimental participants are far more likely to cooperate with the former
rather than the latter: 58% versus 41% in Abric and Kahan (1972), and 59% versus
31% in Kiesler, Sproull, and Waters (1996). These two results suggest that the more
“human” a counterpart is to a player, the more likely that player is to cooperate in
the PD.
The degree of “humanness” seen in the opponent is a function not only of the
opponent’s identity but also of the identity and cognitive abilities of the perceiver.
Chief among these abilities is mentalising. Insofar as theory-of-mind develops
throughout childhood (Astington, 1994), one would expect, then, that older chil-
dren would cooperate more than younger ones. Indeed, Fan (2000) found that 9- and
11-year-old children cooperated more frequently in a 10 round repeated PD than did
7-year olds. This study was less concerned with accounting for the choices of children
than with the eVects of moral suasion and instruction on the promotion of coopera-
tion in the PD (see also Matsumoto, Haan, Yabrove, Theodorou, & Cooke Carney,
1986). Another study of young children (aged 3–10 years) and the PD showed that
older children were more able and willing to pay attention to their opponent’s inter-
ests than younger children, although this was only true if doing so would help improve
their own outcome (Perner, 1979). Other developmental Wndings have shown that the
frequency of prosocial behaviour increases throughout childhood (Eisenberg & Fabes,
1998). In the PD, cooperation, as opposed to defection, is clearly the prosocial move.
In our experiments the performance of normally developing children (aged 6, 8,
and 10 years) as well as high-functioning children with autistic spectrum disorders
was investigated on three versions of a PD game. In the PD games the nature of the
opponent against whom a participant played was manipulated – each participant
played the game against a human and a computer opponent. Furthermore a third
manipulation of the PD was included in which participants played against a human78 D. Sally, E. Hill / Journal of Economic Psychology 27 (2006) 73–97
opponent where the instructions of the game encouraged participants to cooperate,
rather than compete with their opponent (encouraged cooperation PD).
Accordingly, based on the current understanding of theory-of-mind within devel-
opmental psychology and the theories and empirical results most frequently cited
within behavioural economics, a number of hypotheses about the decisions of our
participant groups were generated. With respect to the normally developing sample a
greater degree of cooperation in the PD among the older participants was expected.
Given the diYculties of individuals with autistic spectrum disorders in the area of
mentalising, and the suggestion that mentalising is involved in a participant’s choice
on the PD, it was predicted that children with ASD would cooperate less when play-
ing against the human opponent than their normally developing counterparts would.
Since individuals with autism have been shown to have diYculty only representing
the “mind” of a human and not a machine (Leekam & Perner, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss,
1992), a smaller diVerence in the cooperation rates between the normally developing
children and those with ASD when playing the PD against a computer opponent was
expected. With respect to the encouraged cooperation game, the speciWc instructions
negate the need to predict the intentions of the counterpart, and so, individuals with
and without autism should manifest similar, elevated rates of cooperation.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
A total of 69 children took part in the study. Participants were tested individually
by an experimenter and – for the experimental tasks – a confederate, either in their
school or at the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, UK. All were native English
speakers. Participant details are shown in Table 1. All participants with ASD had
been diagnosed formally with either autism or Asperger syndrome prior to the study.
In addition, a checklist was completed by the experimenter and the confederate for
approximately one-third of the participants. This checklist was based on observation
Table 1
Participant details
Normally developing participants ASD participants
6 years 8 years 10 years
N 14 19 18 18
Male (female) 8 (6) 10 (9) 10 (8) 16 (2)
Calendar age (year month)
Mean 6.7 8.5 10.6 10.6
Std. dev. .2 .3 .3 3.1
Range 6.04–6.11 8.00–8.11 10.03–10.11 6.0–15.0
VIQ
Mean 109.22 103.22 109.3 96.29
Std. dev. 10.87 16.35 11.92 33.7
Range 98.4–133.3 75.1–136.5 89.8–129.6 63.2–211.9
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and related to the key characteristics of the disorder and was used as an aid to con-
Wrm an individual’s diagnosis and therefore the results will not be reported here.
Ethics approval for the study was granted by the National Autistic Society (UK)
and by University College London (UK). Parental consent was required for child
participation in the study and the informed consent of all participants was sought.
2.1.2. General ability
General ability levels were assessed using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale
(BPVS-II, Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 1997). Mean ability levels fell within the
normal range in all groups (see Table 1).
2.1.3. Theory-of-mind
First-order false belief understanding was assessed in all participants using the
Sally–Anne task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), and second-
order false belief understanding was assessed using the Birthday Puppy story (Sulli-
van, Zaitchik, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994). The former test involves a vignette in which
two girls are in the same room. Sally, having Wnished playing with a ball, places it in a
basket and leaves the room. Anne takes the ball and moves it from the basket to a
box that happens to be in the room also. Upon Sally’s return, the key question is,
“Where does she look for her ball?” An error in theory-of-mind is revealed if the
child answers, “the box”, since Sally is unaware of Anne’s covert actions. While this
task involves Wrst-order mentalising, i.e., what are the contents of Sally’s mind, the
Birthday Puppy story is more complicated and asks whether the mother of a little
boy who has been snooping around in the basement behind her back, believes that he
is unaware of his surprise birthday gift – a puppy. The results shown in Table 2
reproduce the general Wnding in the literature: younger children have an immature
theory-of-mind, and children with ASD have reduced mentalising capabilities. Spe-
ciWcally, children with ASD were impaired in both Wrst- and second-order false belief
tests in comparison to their normally developing peers [Wrst-order false belief,
2(1)D18.62, p<0.001; second-order false belief, 2(1)D9.87, p<0.01].
2.1.4. Game theory tasks
The experimental game theory tasks were presented on a laptop computer, the
screen of which was easily visible to both the participant and the confederate who sat
side-by-side (the participant to the right), and the keyboard of which was divided by
a partition hiding half the keys from each person. Participant responses were
recorded on-line for later analysis. The instructions for each task were presented on
Table 2
Percent of each group passing Wrst- and second-order false belief tasks
Normally developing participants ASD participants
6 years 8 years 10 years
First order 100 100 100 66.67
Second order 71.43 94.12 100 55.5680 D. Sally, E. Hill / Journal of Economic Psychology 27 (2006) 73–97
the computer, although these were verbalised by the experimenter to ensure that par-
ticipants understood each task. In all tasks, players were told that they must try to
win as many points as possible and that the total points won on all games would be
exchanged at the end of the testing session for stickers. The greater the number of
points won, the greater the number of stickers at the end of the test session. This
incentive structure reXects the experience that non-monetary rewards are more
appropriate when testing children (Fan, 2000; Harbaugh, Krause, & Liday, 2003).
Two diVerent trial games were played, before the experimental tasks, to ensure that
the principle of the experimental tasks, the response methods, and the incentive struc-
ture were familiar to participants.
Three versions of a Prisoner’s Dilemma task were presented to the participants,
and 16 rounds were completed in each version, although participants were not told
explicitly that this would be the case. This method allowed comparison of partici-
pants’ strategy choice on the Wrst round of the game as well as over all 16 rounds of
each game.
2.1.4.1. Human opponent. A circle and triangle were shown on the computer screen.
Each player (participant, confederate) independently chose either shape having been
told how the points would be awarded (see Table 3). This information was outlined
to the players verbally and was also presented on the tabletop in front of the players
throughout the game. After players had made their choice by pressing the appropri-
ate key on the keyboard, the computer presented the choices made and the number of
points won. The confederate followed a tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy, always making the
cooperative choice – triangle – on the Wrst round and then copying the participant’s
strategy on the previous round for rounds 2–16. The participant was not told that
there would be more than one round of the game.
2.1.4.2. Computer opponent. This version of the task was designed to investigate
whether there was a diVerence in spontaneous strategy used when playing against a
human or computer opponent. The task was identical to that described above with
the computer replacing the human opponent. The computer was programmed to
respond using the same strategy as the human opponent (cooperation on the Wrst
round followed by TFT), although this information was not given to participants.
When playing the human and computer opponent PD games, defection (i.e., competi-
tion) is the equilibrium choice. Empirically, a wealth of studies and broad reviews of
the literature (Dawes, 1980; Sally, 1995) suggest an expected cooperation rate of
Table 3
Points awarded to the participant and confederate in the Prisoner’s Dilemma games
Note: The players did not see the terms cooperate and compete. The terms confederate and participant
were replaced with the appropriate names of the two players in each case.
Confederate Participant
Cooperate (triangle) Compete (circle)
Cooperate (triangle) 3, 3 1, 4
Compete (circle) 4, 1 2, 2D. Sally, E. Hill / Journal of Economic Psychology 27 (2006) 73–97 81
approximately 20% in the Wrst round and then approximately 40% overall as the
repeated nature of the tasks is implicitly recognized. In both games a greater degree
of competition than cooperation would be expected, especially when the opponent is
a computer.
2.1.4.3. Encouraged cooperation. This task was identical to the PD with human oppo-
nent except that the points won on each round of the game were combined for the
two players and divided equally at the end of the game. The confederate continued to
follow a TFT strategy, always making the cooperative choice of triangle on the Wrst
round of the game and then copying the participant’s strategy on the previous round
for rounds 2–16. When both players chose triangle, six points were won collectively;
circle, four points were won collectively; and in cases where each player chose a
diVerent shape, Wve points were won collectively. Note that with this payoV structure,
cooperation becomes the dominant move: irrespective of what the other chooses, a
player gains more points by cooperating. However, this dominance is somewhat
obscured by the visible payoV matrix and the confederate’s continued retaliatory
response to the participant’s choice of circle, and hence, the game is akin to a bluV – it
is a PD on the surface and a purely cooperative game in reality.
The order of play against the human and computer opponents was counterbal-
anced across the participants, with the encouraged cooperation task being completed
last in all cases.
2.2. Results and discussion
The mean number of cooperative responses across the 16 rounds of each PD task
is shown for the normally developing 6-, 8- and 10-year olds and the children with
ASD in Fig. 1. Two facts are immediately apparent: Wrst, our participants were sig-
niWcantly competitive. Based on the literature cited earlier, we would have expected
an average of six to nine cooperative moves in this setting, and our participants were
well under that number in both the human and computer opponent versions. Second,
the diVerences among the various age groups and the normally developing children
and those with ASD are minimal. This similarity is conWrmed by a repeated measures
ANOVA with one between factor (participant group) and one within factor (PD
game type). For performance across the 16 rounds of each game, there was a signiW-
cant eVect of game type [F(2,63)D30.49, p<.001], indicating reliably higher levels of
cooperation in the encouraged cooperation version of the task in comparison to both
the human- and computer-opponent versions. However, there was no signiWcant
diVerence in the level of cooperation seen across the groups [F(3,63)D0.38, p>.1].
Hence, when considering the results by age group and by diagnosis of ASD, none of
our initial hypotheses are conWrmed: older children are not more cooperative, the
normally developing children are not more competitive with the computer, the chil-
dren with ASD are not more competitive with a human counterpart, and not all sub-
jects cooperate fully in the third, payoV-altered version of the PD.
The same overall cooperation rate could disguise a number of very diVerent pat-
terns. For example, cooperation could start oV very high initially and then decay, or82 D. Sally, E. Hill / Journal of Economic Psychology 27 (2006) 73–97
distrust could be prevalent at Wrst with mutual cooperation emerging as TFT strate-
gies are identiWed and synchronized. Moreover, given that the participants were
never told explicitly about the number of rounds, cooperation in the Wrst round was
less likely to be motivated by reputation or reciprocity. Fig. 2 reveals that the 6-year
olds generally were less likely to cooperate initially. Accordingly, this youngest group
increased their average cooperation rate over the subsequent 15 rounds, while the
Fig. 1. Average cooperation rate over 16 rounds by group.
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older normally developing children became more competitive. The children with
ASD, in direct opposition to our hypothesis, were more competitive when they Wrst
confronted the computer opponent.
By comparing the choice made on the last round of the second PD game played
(either against the human or computer opponent) with the choice made on the Wrst
round of the encouraged cooperation version of the PD (rounds 32 and 33 respec-
tively), the extent to which individuals recognised the switch in the rational choice to
be made according to the new task demands was considered. The data were investi-
gated for each group separately using a series of Wilcoxon tests to compare the level
of cooperation on each pairing of the PD games. There was a marginally signiWcant
diVerence between the choice of shape made in rounds 32 and 33 when the 6-, 8- and
10-year olds were considered separately [6 years, ZD¡1.63, p<.1; 8 years, ZD¡1.73,
p<.05; 10 years, ZD¡1.0, p>.1], although when combined, the normally developing
children showed a signiWcant diVerence between the choice of shape in the two rounds
[ZD¡2.5, p<.01]. Overall, then, the normally developing children adjusted immedi-
ately to the changes in the rules and payoV structure of the game. By sharp contrast,
for the children with ASD, there was absolutely no signiWcant diVerence between the
choice of shape in the two rounds under consideration [ZD.0, p>.1]. It is conceivable
that this diYculty in switching strategies and responding to the new payoV matrix is
related to a general tendency in ASD toward rule-oriented behaviour and persevera-
tion (Perner & Lang, 2000).
Taken together these results show that although there was no signiWcant diVerence
between the average degree of cooperation elicited in the individuals with ASD and
controls when all rounds of each game were taken together, more subtle diVerences
were evident in the detail. These diVerences and similarities can be more fully explained
with an explicit analysis of the role of mentalising in fostering or retarding cooperation
in these games.
In order to establish whether there was a relationship between mentalising ability
and choice of strategy when playing each version of the PD, a comparison was made
between performance on the second-order false belief test and the degree of coopera-
tion evidenced in each game for the child participant groups. A repeated measures
ANOVA with two between factors (group; second-order false belief performance) and
one within factor (PD game) was applied to the data for number of cooperative moves
(children with ASD versus all normally developing children together). There was a sig-
niWcant eVect of game [F(1,62)D19.72, p<.001], as described previously. The eVect of
false belief approached signiWcance [F(1,62)D3.72, pD.058], suggesting that second-
order false belief passers had a tendency to be more cooperative than second-order
false belief failers, irrespective of whether or not an individual was diagnosed with
ASD. A child who failed this false belief test (i.e., saying the mother knew her son
knew about the surprise birthday puppy) presumably also had a tough time under-
standing what the counterpart’s beliefs about the child’s own intentions were in the
PD. Generally, a player wants to be cooperative only if she forsakes narrow self-inter-
est and if she can anticipate that the other will cooperate (Kiyonari, Tanida, &
Yamagishi, 2000). The target of this latter anticipation is, of course, a similarly condi-
tional, cooperative expectation, and hence, the importance of a theory-of-mind.84 D. Sally, E. Hill / Journal of Economic Psychology 27 (2006) 73–97
None of the normally developing children failed the Wrst-order false belief task,
while a third of the children with ASD did so. To determine the relationship between
this fundamental mentalising capacity and cooperation, the performance of the chil-
dren with ASD was analysed with a one between factor (Wrst-order false belief per-
formance) and one within factor (PD game) repeated measures ANOVA. There was
a signiWcant eVect of the game [F(1,16)D2.13, p<.05], as described previously. Pass-
ing the false belief task signiWcantly decreased cooperation across the games, mean
number of cooperative responses, 4.72 and 7.27 for false belief passers and failers,
respectively [F(1,16)D4.46, p<.05]. There was no interaction between game and task
performance [F(2,16)D2.01, p>.1].
This result is the opposite of the one reported for second-order false belief: an
acutely malfunctioning theory-of-mind enhanced cooperation. The children who
could not decipher the Wrst-order false belief task (i.e., they respond (mistakenly) that
Sally believes the ball is now in the box) cooperated, on average, in approximately
half the trials of each of the PD game versions. One of the ways a player could gener-
ate a cooperation rate of 50% is to simply choose randomly on each round without
any regard for the decisions of the counterpart. If this form of decision-making were
employed, the player would be equally likely to choose the circle or the triangle in a
round regardless of which shape the opponent chose on the previous round, in other
words, random reciprocation. (The tit-for-tat strategy, by contrast, assures that circle
follows the other’s circle and triangle, triangle with certainty.) For each of the chil-
dren with ASD, the conditional response rates to the opponent’s cooperating or
defecting in the previous round were calculated. The hypotheses that these condi-
tional response rates were equal to 50% were tested for those children who had
passed or failed the Sally–Anne task. For the ASD children with Wrst-order false
belief troubles the hypothesis of random reciprocation could not be rejected in three
of four instances (computer opponent: cooperation after cooperation t(5)D.0, p>.1,
defection after defection t(5)D1.42, p>.1; human opponent: cooperation after coop-
eration t(5)D.44, p>.1, defection after defection t(5)D4.07, p<.01). In this last case,
defection was reciprocated a little more than 70% of the time. By contrast, those who
passed the Wrst-order false belief test did not respond randomly in any setting (com-
puter opponent: cooperation after cooperation t(12)D¡3.19, p<.01, defection after
defection  t(12)D4.83,  p<.001; human opponent: cooperation after cooperation
t(12)D¡3.71, p<.005, defection after defection t(12)D6.23, p<.001). This sub-group
of test passers was more likely to reciprocate defection and to exploit cooperation.
The evidence, then, strongly suggests that a Wrst-order theory-of-mind is necessary to
respond in a strategic fashion in the PD.
2.2.1. Summary
The broad similarity across age groups and between normally developing children
and those with autistic spectrum disorder suggests that having immature mentalising
capabilities (as in the case of the 6-year olds) or a hindered theory-of-mind (as in the
case of the children with ASD) was not a major impediment in this version of the PD.
We know that there are many social games – conversation, joint attention, pretend
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those with ASD are glaring. Clearly, then, this abstract version of the PD did not
embody the social complexity of other forms of human interaction.
Nevertheless, mentalising ability aided strategic behaviour irrespective of the pres-
ence or absence of autism. Those children with ASD with very ineVectual theory-of-
mind skills responded largely randomly to the moves of their human and computer
counterparts. Among all the children, the ability to pass the more complex theory-of-
mind task either intuitively or through conscious cognitive eVort was correlated with
greater levels of cooperation. Such a correlation may be driven by the need to per-
ceive the opponent’s intention to cooperate or reciprocate, a perception obscure to
those without suYcient mentalising skills. These results are the Wrst direct demonstra-
tion of the eVects of mentalising ability on strategic behaviour in games.
In the PD, the issues of cooperation, generosity, and retribution are interwoven
with uncertainty about the counterpart’s intentions and actions and with a multiplic-
ity of rationales for a given action in each round. These interweavings may be
clariWed by a second study, in which an alternative form of strategic interaction –
bargaining – was investigated.
3. Experiment two – bargaining
Nature, an innumerate bank teller, an overstocked shelf, gravity, a misplaced wal-
let, an academic researcher, or some other dea ex machina might endow an individual
not only with a prize but also with a companion and with a decision about sharing. In
the Dictator game, the choice is how much of the prize to grant to the other party
who is bound to accept the grant. In the Ultimatum game, the choice is how much of
the value to oVer to the other party who then may accept the oVer or refuse it. Accep-
tance achieves the suggested division; refusal results in the whole prize being with-
drawn and both parties receiving nothing. For example, an experimenter might
confer upon a participant 10 candies (Murnighan & Saxon, 1998), 10 marks or some
other unit of currency (Güth & Tietz, 1990), or 10 points or tokens (Harbaugh et al.,
2003). This endowed person would, as a dictator, decide how many of the 10 units, if
any, to give to another person, and as the proposer in the Ultimatum game, how
many to oVer the other party knowing that a rebuV would wipe out the grant entirely.
The Ultimatum game represents, among other social situations, the possibility in a
negotiation of one bargainer making a Wnal oVer to the counterpart and walking
away from the table leaving the other to sign the deal or not. Experience and intro-
spection tell us that in this setting such a dramatic proposal has a good chance of fail-
ing. However, in orthodox economics, such an ultimatum should work: the
equilibrium, corresponding to the prediction based on rational self-interest, is that
the responder should accept any oVer greater than zero, and therefore, the proposer
should oVer the smallest possible positive amount. In fact, this equilibrium is rarely
realized in any of the numerous assays that have been conducted in laboratories and
Weld sites around the world during the last 20 years. The regular Wndings, rather, are
the following: (i) the modal oVer is between 40% and 50% of the whole prize, (ii) tiny
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below a third of the total (see Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Güth & Tietz, 1990; Ooster-
beek, Sloof, & van de Kuilen, 2004 for reviews).
The literature has focused on understanding why oVers are so robust, and why
responders are so rancorous. One possible explanation for the generosity of the pro-
posers is that they have a certain taste for fairness and a preference for sharing some
part, or even half, of their dowry. Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton (1994) asked
participants to play an Ultimatum game and a Dictator game to test this hypothesis,
since fairness considerations would dictate that proposers give the same amount in
both games. However, these authors found that the proportion of equal split oVers
declined from 75% in a $10 Ultimatum game to 21% in a $10 Dictator game. The
mean oVer in a standard 10 unit Dictator game is between 20% and 25% (Rigdon,
2003), and in the Ultimatum game, 40% and 45%. Roughly, then, half of the typical
proposer’s generosity is driven by a taste for fairness and half by strategic consider-
ations of the possible spite of the responder.
Subsequent Dictator experiments have shown that the taste for fairness can be
heightened or slaked by the context of the game. The degree of selWshness among dic-
tators is raised by allowing them complete anonymity, even from the experimenter
(HoVman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996) and by placing them in a business setting of buy-
ing and selling (HoVman, McCabe, Shacat, & Smith, 1994); the frequency of altruistic
grants is raised if the recipient is a charity (Eckel & Grossman, 1996) and if more per-
sonal characteristics of the recipient are identiWed (Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Charness &
Gneezy, forthcoming). Subsequent Ultimatum experiments have shown that the stra-
tegic and fairness concerns of both parties move in predictable directions: when the
proposed split of $10 is generated by a roulette wheel as opposed to another person,
the mean minimal oVer acceptable to responders is much lower – $1.20 rather than
$2.91 (Blount, 1995); when a written note saying “I know you’d like more, but that’s
the way it goes” is attached to a small oVer, a rebuV from the responders is more
likely (Kravitz & Gunto, 1992); when the endowment is worth more to one side than
the other (e.g., 50! versus 10! per chip) and the other side is ignorant of this fact,
advantaged proposers are more likely to suggest an even split of the counting units
rather than total value, and advantaged responders are more likely to reject fair splits
of the underlying units to induce a more equitable split of surplus value (Croson,
1996; Kagel, Kim, & Moser, 1996).
The variants just described could be reXective of mentalising ability or social rule-
following. For instance, a person might reject a small oVer because she imagines that
the proposer thinks she is unworthy, gullible, or dim-witted, or because she recog-
nizes this game as a sharing situation which demands that greedy people be punished.
Similarly, a muniWcent dictator might utilize her theory-of-mind to anticipate the dis-
appointment of an unfunded recipient, or she might recognize the applicability of a
sharing norm. A norm may substitute for mentalising: as the other driver in a narrow
lane approaches, you need not read his eyes, thoughts, or intentions, you need only
remember the locale and move to the left in the UK and to the right in the US. Men-
talising may become necessary only if the interaction does not proceed as expected:
when the other driver fails to move to the proper side, then you need to notice the
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The evidence on the relative utilization of mentalising versus norm-following in
the standard, anonymous Ultimatum game is mixed. On the one hand, Henrich et al.
(2001) found that much of the variance in mean oVers among 15 small-scale societies
(ranging from 26% among the Machiguenga in Peru to 58% among the Lamelara in
Indonesia) could be explained by two factors – the importance of cooperation in the
society’s economic production and the reliance on market exchange in daily life.
These factors would seem to develop and mould norm formation rather than mental-
ising abilities. The authors themselves suggest that their participants applied the
analogous (and varying) norms found in their societies:
[W]hen faced with a novel situation (the experiment), they looked for analogues
in their daily experience, asking “What familiar situation is this game like?” and
then acted in a way appropriate for the analogous situation. For instance, the
hyper-fairƒoVers (greater than 50 percent) and the frequent rejections of these
oVers among the Au and Gnau reXect the culture of gift-givingƒ, accepting
gifts, even unsolicited ones, commits one to reciprocate at some future time to
be determined by the giver (Henrich et al., 2001, p. 76).
A second experiment that both documented the under-utilization of mentalising
and its potential impact is that of HoVman, McCabe, and Smith (2000). Here, in a $10
Ultimatum game with a business context, an additional line was added to the instruc-
tions encouraging the proposer (i.e., seller) to strategize and read the mind of the oppo-
nent: “Before making your choice, consider what choice you expect the buyer to make.
Also consider what you think the buyer expects you to choose”. This encouragement
caused the mean oVer to rise to $4.17 from $3.71 in a control condition where no
explicit mindreading prompt was given, and this increase suggests that proposers in the
control condition were solving the game without fully employing their theory-of-mind.
On the other hand, studies in which an asymmetry in information between the
oVerer and responder is strategically exploited support the relative prominence of men-
talising. Respondents in one experiment received a set sequence of 12 oVers for either $1
or $2 out of a total surplus of $20 (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). There was a compli-
cated information structure overlaid on the set of games: (i) during the Wrst half of the
sequence, none of the responders knew that the total prize was $20, making it diYcult
to deem an oVer unfair; (ii) half of the responders knew that the (Wctitious) oVerers
knew that the low oVers were unfair and therefore could more easily attribute greedy
intentions to them. (Note that this second manipulation depends upon a theory-if-mind
both to understand the diVerent contents of the other’s mind and to respond emotion-
ally.) After making each decision, participants reported how they reacted to the oVer
and how they felt. These verbal responses were coded for the degrees of unfairness and
anger expressed. In relation to the current study there were two important Wndings:
Wrst, the manipulation relying on theory-of-mind was successful – participants who
knew both that an oVer was low and that the other knew it was low were far angrier.
Second, this anger resulted in a greater frequency of rejection, and was more predictive
of the likelihood of rejection than was the expressed degree of unfairness alone.
As any overtaxed parent can testify, children reject various ultimatums all day
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prosocial behaviour among children, some of it emphasizing social rules and some,
perspective taking. Numerous donation studies (similar to the Dictator game) have
found that children are more generous when they have seen a model being gener-
ous (e.g., Harris, 1970; Wilson, Piazza, & Nagle, 1990). Within social learning theory
(Bandura, 1986), a model aVects the observer by directly representing the presence or
application of a rule rather than by triggering a mediating internal process, suggesting
that mentalising is less important in giving. On the other hand, a child’s abilities to
take the perspective of another person visually, emotionally, and cognitively are posi-
tively related to prosocial behaviour in most studies (Underwood & Moore, 1982),
and in one speciWc study, two factors relying on a child’s theory-of-mind, aVective rea-
soning and sympathy, caused a large increase in donations to a needy person (Knight,
Johnson, Carlo, & Eisenberg, 1994). Both sources of prosociality should become
stronger as children grow up, and indeed, a meta-analysis by Eisenberg and Fabes
(1998) found that sharing and donating became more prevalent from preschool
through adolescence.
Two speciWc Ultimatum studies, however, showed a less clear developmental trend.
Harbaugh et al. (2003) found that fourth and Wfth graders made larger grants as dicta-
tors than did second graders or ninth graders. While these authors found that ultima-
tum proposals on average increased with grade level, Murnighan and Saxon (1998)
found a non-monotonic pattern with kindergarteners oVering more candies than third
graders, who, in a game with a dollar at stake, oVered fewer cents than did sixth grad-
ers, who were more generous than ninth graders. Finally, younger children in both
studies were more likely to accept small oVers. This mixture of results demonstrates
that the oVering and responding behaviour of children may be aVected by the speciWc
details of game presentation, and may reXect a general inconsistency in inference
about social interaction. Kalish (2002) has shown that while children and adults will
equally predict consistency in repeated physical events such as pumice Xoating in
water, children will much more often predict that a person would behave diVerently in
the future than he or she did in the past, for instance, preferring Bert tomorrow despite
preferring Ernie today. If the reaction of the other party is inconsistent or unreliable,
then it makes sense to accept whatever the current oVer is, and to not be too strategic
in formulating an oVer.
By investigating the giving and receiving behaviour of children with and without
ASD, the importance of mentalising for both generosity and consistency can be
determined.
3.1. Method
The participants were the same as those included in the Wrst experiment, with the
addition of one 8-year-old.
3.1.1. Materials and methods
The testing set-up remained the same as that reported for the Wrst experiment with
participants being assessed in a quiet room, sitting at a laptop to the right of the con-
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presented on the computer and the experimenter verbalised them to ensure that par-
ticipants understood each task. Players were told that they must try to win as many
points as possible and that the total points won on the games would be exchanged at
the end of the testing session for stickers. Two versions of a bargaining task – Dicta-
tor game and Ultimatum game – were completed by participants, with the Dictator
game always played Wrst.
3.1.1.1. Dictator game. The dictator (participant) was given 10 points and asked how
much s/he wanted to give to the opponent, knowing that s/he would keep the remain-
der. Eleven cards were presented on the computer screen, outlining all possible per-
mutations by which the points could be split, ranging from the dictator keeping all 10
points for her/himself to giving all 10 points to the opponent. The dictator made his
or her choice and indicated this by selecting the relevant card on the computer screen.
The choice that the dictator had made and the points allocated to both players were
displayed. This process was repeated 16 times throughout the course of the game,
with the participant acting as the dictator for rounds 1–4 and 9–12, and the confeder-
ate taking the part of the dictator for the remaining rounds. The participant was
unaware that there would be more than one round of the Dictator game and that the
confederate would also take a turn as the dictator. In the latter case the confederate
allocated approximately the same amount of points to the participant as the partici-
pant had to her.
3.1.1.2. Ultimatum game. This game was essentially the same as the Dictator game but
the counterpart had the choice to accept or reject the oVer made to him or her by the
proposer in each round of the game. The game started in the same manner as the Dic-
tator game. Once the proposer had made an oVer, the opponent indicated whether s/he
accepted or rejected that oVer. If the opponent accepted the proposer’s oVer, the
points were divided as proposed (exactly as in the Dictator game). If the opponent
rejected the proposer’s oVer, neither player received any points. The choices made by
each player, as well as the points won, were displayed after each round of the game.
The set-up of the Ultimatum game was identical to that of the Dictator game, with the
participant acting as the proposer and the confederate as the opponent for rounds 1–4
and 9–12, and with the roles reversed for the remaining rounds. The participant was
not told explicitly that there would be more than one round of the game and that the
confederate would also take a turn as the proposer. As a responder, the confederate
always rejected oVers of less than an equal split (i.e., four or fewer points) and, as a
proposer, she allocated approximately the same amount of points to the participant as
the participant had to her.
3.2. Results and discussion
3.2.1. OVers made
The oVers made by the participant to the confederate were expected to be lower in
the Dictator game than in the Ultimatum game. The mean points oVered to the con-
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round only, are shown for each group in Fig. 3a and b respectively. A repeated mea-
sures ANOVA with one between factor (group) and one within factor (game) was
applied to the data for mean points oVered. For performance across the Wrst four
rounds of each game, there was a signiWcant eVect of group [F(3,65)D3.70, p<.02]. A
series of Tukey tests revealed this diVerence to arise from higher oVers being made by
the six- in comparison to the 8-year-old children [p<.05]. There was a signiWcant
eVect of game [F(1,65)D49.38, p<.001], reXecting higher oVers being made to the
confederate in the Ultimatum game, and an insigniWcant interaction between group
and game [F(3,65)D1.66, p>.10]. These results correspond to the equivocal results of
previous Ultimatum studies in that there was no clear trend in oVer amounts across
age groups. More work is needed to explain this Wnding within the prosocial develop-
ment literature which shows that sharing and donating become more prevalent as
children grow up (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998). A tentative explanation for the diVer-
ences may be that this task evoked exchange norms which are already fairly Wrmly
implanted by the age of six.
We can begin to distinguish the groups of children when we look at what they do
when they Wrst encounter the bargaining games. A slightly diVerent pattern of perfor-
mance was seen in the analysis of the mean oVers made to the confederate on the Wrst
round of each game [group, F(3,65)D1.03,  p>.1; game, F(1,65)D52.89,  p<.001;
group by game, F(3,65)D4.18, p<.01]. The interaction is driven largely by the 6-year
olds whose initial proVered share increases by 44% as the game changes from Dicta-
tor to Ultimatum. In turn, the oVers of the children with ASD, both at Wrst and over
the Wrst four trials, grew only modestly as the receiver was enabled to say “no” in the
Ultimatum game.
More evidence for the relative eVects of autism on fairness and tactical giving
appear when looking at the underlying distributions of oVers. In particular, Fig. 4 dis-
plays the dispersal of Wrst round ultimatum oVers by all normally developing children
versus those of the children with ASD. Visually, there appears to be a strong diver-
gence. We used the powerful Epps and Singleton (1986) test to determine if these two
samples of discrete data were likely to be from identical populations. This CF statistic,
based on the empirical characteristic function, is asymptotically distributed as chi-
square with four degrees of freedom and can be corrected for small samples. For the
Fig. 3. (a) Average points oVered to counterpart on Wrst four rounds. (b) Average points oVered to coun-
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Wrst round ultimatum oVers, the null hypothesis of similar distributions is strongly
rejected [CFD9.96,  p<.05]. Moreover, when comparing Wrst round dictator oVers
there were no signiWcant diVerences in the underlying distributions across the partici-
pants. Since the initial dictator grants were the same, it can be concluded that core
generosity did not vary by age or with ASD. However, once an element of strategic
anticipation was added by empowering the responder in the Ultimatum game, those
diagnosed with autistic spectrum disorders diverged. A majority of these children
seemed to employ one of two salient rules: cut the total in half, or keep it all, resulting
in oVers of Wve and zero, respectively. In contrast, more than half of the normally
developing participants oVered to share equally.
The direct eVects of mentalising on Wrst round oVers among all the children can be
seen in Fig. 5. The striking visual diVerence in the distribution of oVers is strongly
conWrmed by an Epps-Singleton test (CFD9.64, p<.05). Here, the majority of those
children, both control and ASD, who failed the second-order false belief test oVered
the responder nothing or only one point, while the majority of those who passed the
test oVered an even split. (These distributions of initial oVers have means whose dis-
tinctiveness approaches signiWcance [F(1,63)D3.73, pD.058].) A theory-of-mind that
was eVective due to intuition or synthetic construction was very helpful to the child
making a reasonable oVer in this game.
The extent of learning across rounds of the Ultimatum game was investigated, in
light of the apparently diVerent strategies of the individuals with and without ASD.
The confederate consistently rejected oVers of four points or fewer, so participants
had the chance to learn, adjust and converge on the optimal oVer of an even split. A
comparison of the groups on a round by round basis was made on the Dictator and
Ultimatum games for all eight rounds. A repeated measures ANOVA with one
between factor (group) and two within factors (bargaining game, round) was applied
to the data for the mean oVer made by each group on all eight rounds of each game.
Fig. 4. Distribution of initial ultimatum oVers by participants with and without ASD.
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There was a signiWcant eVect of game [F(1,67)D62.38, p<.001], described previously
and a signiWcant interaction between group, bargaining game and round [F(1,67)D
4.21, p<.01]. This interaction highlighted divergence between the amounts oVered to
the confederate in the two games on round one in the normally developing children
only. Most of the children seem to learn the game quickly: by the second round the
oVers of children with ASD and those of normally developing children are dispersed
in statistically similar ways. This concurrence is conWrmed by the insigniWcance of
second-order theory-of-mind in an ANOVA of average oVer over all eight rounds.
The one group that remains distinct are the 6-year olds: even after 11 rounds of the
game, in their Wnal turns as proposers, their oVers are scattered over all the possibili-
ties and are distributed diVerently from those of the 8- and 10-year olds [CFD11.62,
p<.02] and those of the children with ASD [CFD8.29, p<.10]. Again, this excess
dispersion may be in keeping with the Wnding that younger children are less likely to
predict consistency in the actions of other people, in this case, the responder (Kalish,
2002).
3.2.2. OVers rejected
One consistent Wnding of the bargaining studies discussed earlier has been that
younger, normally developing children are more likely to accept smaller oVers. Our
data conWrm this pattern: when faced with an oVer of less than half of the 10 points,
the 6- and 8-year old responders said yes 22.8% of the time, while the 10-year olds
agreed only 10.6% of the time. Interestingly, this diVerence was caused not by varying
reactions to tiny oVers of one or two points, but by the younger children’s willing-
ness to accept four points (36% acceptance of these oVers, compared to 14% for the
10-year olds). There was one additional bit of evidence on the relationship of age to
oVer rejection: three 6-year olds were the only participants to accept every oVer made
by the confederate.
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A comparison of the respondent decisions of the control participants and those
with ASD is shown in Fig. 6. Children diagnosed with ASD were much more likely to
accept not only minority oVers but piddling ones as well. Whereas the normally
developing children refused 89% of the confederate’s proposals of three or fewer
points, the ASD children rebuVed only 68% of this level of oVer. On the other hand,
when the oVer was fair or more than fair (Wve or six points out of 10), then the nor-
mally developing children almost never refused it (2% of oVers), while ASD children
were more likely to decline (21% of oVers). Since the incentive structure was clear to
all participants, the variation between the groups’ respondent decisions is likely to be
a manifestation of their relative abilities in discerning the intentions of the oVerer.
For the children with ASD these intentions are likely to be quite obscure and indeci-
pherable.
3.2.3. Summary
The behaviour of the youngest normally developing children (aged 6 years)
diverged most radically as the context of the game changed. Not only were they
stingy in their Wrst trial as a dictator, but they were, initially, overly beneWcent as the
ultimatum oVerer, and they were unaVected by the repetition and learning of the
game. For the older groups, repeating the Ultimatum game caused diVerences to dis-
sipate and distributions of oVers to converge. Children with ASD were distinguished
from their peers in the initial round of the Ultimatum game but not the Dictator
game. Children with ASD showed an equal predilection for proposals of nil or Wve in
contrast to normally developing children who were most likely to just divide the prize
in half. An ineVective theory-of-mind was apt to result in an initial oVer of no more
Fig. 6. Acceptance rates of diVerent oVer sizes.
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than one point, while deciphering the second-order false belief story correctly tended
to lead to an equitable oVer. The development of theory-of-mind skills may help the
child Wrst to recognize and act upon relevant norms of behaviour such as fairness,
and later, to stretch those norms and improvise away from them when the situation
calls for it.
A single experience as proposer was suYcient to counteract any deWcits in mental-
ising in the succeeding rounds of the this Ultimatum game. Without question, the
static nature of the payoVs and counterpart in this bargaining game is essential to
the observed decay in the eVects of mentalising. A more dynamic and realistic nego-
tiation would probably continue to demand the application of an active theory-of-
mind.
Finally, the rejection of oVers did vary with age and with diagnosis: both younger
normally developing children and those with ASD were more accepting of small
oVers. It is possible that the ability to perceive another’s unfair intent or contempt is
necessary to reject oVers of 40% percent or less, and oppositely, the ability to sense
regard is necessary to accept generous proposal. Hence, even in this very basic negoti-
ation setting, the generation of an initial appropriate oVer, the denial of an inapt or
inequitable oVer, and the acceptance of a fair proposal may depend on the bar-
gainer’s theory-of-mind.
4. Conclusion
We have made two contributions to behavioural economics and to the understand-
ing of economic socialisation: Wrst, we have introduced a new pool of experimental
participants to the literature – those diagnosed with autistic spectrum disorder. One of
the core deWcits of autism involves the theory-of-mind, the ability to perceive and
interpret the contents of another person’s mind. Theory-of-mind is critical to many, if
not most, forms of social interaction, and by serving as a partial contrast, those with
ASD can illuminate what roles mentalising plays in the behaviour of non-autistic peo-
ple. Second, by utilizing the false belief tests central to the study of autism in children,
we have been able to discern some of the direct eVects of mentalising ability on coop-
eration, fairness, generosity and strategic behavior. A minimally functioning theory-
of-mind is necessary to make an intentional, non-stochastic choice in the repeated PD.
A child’s ability to pass the second-order false belief test, arising from either a func-
tional theory-of-mind or eVortful rule-following, was found to be positively related to
the likelihood of cooperation in the three PD games and to perfectly fair ultimatum
oVers rather than very small proposals. Furthermore, participants with ASD accepted
small oVers more frequently.
While we believe these Wndings are signiWcant, a larger question looms – why were
there so many concurrences between the children with ASD and those who were nor-
mally developing? Such similarity does not mirror the behavioural diVerences
observed in such individuals in similar real-life situations. One possible answer lies
in the speciWcs of our protocol: the payoVs in the PD matrix may have been too
subjectively close to motivate cooperation; the presence of the confederate, thoughD. Sally, E. Hill / Journal of Economic Psychology 27 (2006) 73–97 95
necessary to help guide the participants with ASD through the lengthy testing session,
may have been awkward for all subjects; the repetition of the bargaining games may
have been more tiring than fruitful; within subject eVects across games may not be
completely controlled for; etc. These Xaws should certainly be remedied in subsequent
experiments.
A second answer is that a fully developed theory-of-mind may be suYcient but not
necessary for basic strategic rationality, sometimes knowledge of basic rules of behav-
iour will suYce. Mentalising capability increased levels of cooperation in some settings
and degrees of strategic behaviour in others. In other ways, however, we did not see
the drastic discontinuities between the normally developing children and the children
with ASD that we would see if the game involved reciting a joke, telling a story, creat-
ing an imaginary scene, appreciating an emotion, or gazing into another’s eyes. Per-
haps it is the on-line aspects of mentalising and mental Xexibility that cause the
greatest diYculty for high-functioning individuals with ASD in dilemma and bargain-
ing situations in the real-world. These “games” are more suVused in social context
with more distractions and fewer direct cues to guide behavioural choices than are
those in the sterile laboratory where tasks can be seen to be abstract. If this answer is
correct, then it reinforces the position that there is a signiWcant discontinuity between
games in the laboratory and games in the market, the oYce and the home, for those
with ASD and those without. We are currently investigating this possibility.
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